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FOREWORD: DISABILITY AND IDENTITY
MICHAEL ASHLEY STEIN*
I. INTRODUCTION: DISABILITY AND (SUPREME COURT) IDENTITY
Speaking extra-judicially, Justice O'Connor remarked that the
2002 Supreme Court session would be '"remembered as the
disabilities act term"'1 due to the number of cases involving inter-
pretation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).2 Her
statement reverberates with unintended irony. Although the Court
handed down fourteen ADA-related decisions between 1998 and
* Assistant Professor, College of William and Mary School of Law. I thank Ashley
Handwerk (2004) and Holland Tahvonen (2003) for their superlative assistance. The
generosity of the Institute of Bill of Rights Law in sponsoring this Symposium was equaled
only by that of its Director, Davison Douglas, who was a constant source of wisdom and
support. The in-person Symposium also owes much of its success to the efforts of the
Institute's Melody Nichols and to the contributions of participants Professor Anita Silvers
and the Honorable Robert M. Bell. My research was funded in part by NIDRR grant
#H133F010012.
1. See Charles Lane, O'Connor Criticizes Disabilities Law as Too Vague, WASH. POST,
Mar. 15, 2002, at A2 (quoting Justice O'Connor). This phrase was previously used by a
commentator taking the Court to task for the unseemliness of its earlier decisions. See Aviam
Soifer, The Disability Term: Dignity, Default, and Negative Capability, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1279
(2000) (focusing on the six disability cases decided by the Court during the 1998-99 term).
2. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12001-12213 (2000).
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2002,' some dozen years after the statute's passage it is unclear
which individuals are, or ought to be, covered by its provisions.4
Nor has the Court's recent interest, intense as it is following eight
years of silence, afforded much guidance on this key issue.' Echoing
the admonition in the Gondoliers by Don Alhambra Del Bolero that,
"[wihen everybody is somebod[y], [then no one's anybody,"6 the
Court zealously has taken on a gatekeeping role, ensuring that only
those individuals with disabilities "worthy" of the appellation 7 be
afforded ADA protection.8 Nonetheless, the Justices' ADA juris-
3. Specifically, the Court has issued rulings in six cases directly raising employment
claims (Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. 2045 (2002); US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,
122 S. Ct. 1516 (2002); Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002);
Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527
U.S. 471 (1999); and Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999)); three which
indirectly raise employment claims (EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002); Bd. of
Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); and Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys.
Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999)); and five others raising nonemployment issues (Barnes v. Gorman,
122 S. Ct. 2097 (2002); PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001); Olmstead v. Zimring,
527 U.S. 581 (1999); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998); and Pa. Dep't of Corr. v. Yesky,
524 U.S. 206 (1998)).
4. Much ink has been, and will continue to be, spilled over this issue. See, e.g., Chai R.
Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: What Happened?
Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 93-94 (2000)
(describing the drafting history of the ADA and proposing amendments to clarify the
definition of disability); Harlan Hahn, Accommodations and the ADA: Unreasonable Bias or
Biased Reasoning?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 166, 173 (2000) (suggesting that courts
should employ a sociopolitical definition of disability); Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The Supreme
Court's Definition of Disability Under the ADA- A Return to the Dark Ages, 52 ALA. L. REV.
321, 370 (2000) (concluding that the Court's decisions regarding the definition of disability
.seriously undermine the purposes and goals of the ADA"); Rebecca Harmer White, Deference
and Disability Discrimination, 99 MICH. L. REV. 532, 579-81 (2000) (arguing that the Court
should defer to the EEOC's interpretations of the definition of disability).
5. Moreover, "the Court has not yet granted certiorari in any case where a reasonable
accommodation has been upheld, thus making it difficult to discern what they would consider
a reasonable accommodation." Michael Ashley Stein, Disability, Employment Policy, and the
Supreme Court, 55 STAN. L. REV. 607, 629 (2002). For the nonce, Barnett holds that, absent
a showing of special circumstances, a requested accommodation that conflicts with a seniority
system is ordinarily unreasonable. 122 S. Ct. at 1519.
6. WILLIAM S. GILBERT & ARTHUR SULLIVAN, THE GONDOLIERS, ACT 2, song by Don
Alhambra, with Marco and Giuseppe.
7. Anita Silvers and I argue elsewhere that determining disability in the context of
accommodation requests necessarily requires courts to decide who is morally worthy of
protection. See Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein, "And Accommodations for All" (Feb.
2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
8. They are not alone in this desire. See John W. Parry, Supreme Court Narrows and
Expands ADA Disability Definition, 26 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 15, 16 (2002)
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prudence is less reminiscent of a Gilbert and Sullivan operetta than
it is of a Jackie Mason comedy routine.9
According to the Court, to fit under the ADA, an individual has to
be neither too little disabled nor too greatly disabled;" has to be
disabled despite measures that mitigate her disability;11 has to be
credentialed as disabled if an employer perceived of her as disabled,
but only if the employer admits that it did so;12 and always needs to
be able to perform essential job functions" while at the same time
(absent accommodation) be functionally impaired from conducting
not only the job at issue, but a range of other jobs as well. 4 In
determining disability status, the Court need not defer to Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulations," but
(noting that an individual must bring substantial evidence of an impairment beyond a medical
diagnosis to sustain his claim).
9. For a self-provided overview, see http/www.jackiemason.com (last visited Jan. 28,
2003).
10. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) (holding that an
employee with carpal tunnel syndrome who was unable to perform repetitive job functions at
a car manufacturing plant was not disabled enough to qualify for protection under the ADA
because she was able to perform normal household chores); Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,
527 U.S. 555, 565-66 (1999) (ruling that a monocular truck driver who was not rehired
because he failed to meet the Department of Transportation's vision standards did not qualify
for ADA protection as he was able to compensate for his impairment); Sutton v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 488-89 (1999) (holding that severely myopic twins who were
precluded from positions as global airline pilots were not considered disabled because their
vision was correctable with glasses); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 521
(1999) (ruling that a mechanic with high blood pressure did not qualify as disabled under the
ADA because "when medicated, petitioner's high blood pressure [did] not substantially limit
him in any major life activity").
11. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. at 565-66 (concluding that a court must consider mitigating
measures when determining if an individual is disabled); Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483 (finding that
an impaired individual may not be substantially limited in a major life activity if such
impairment is corrected by mitigating measures); Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521 (holding that the
petitioner is not substantially limited in one or more life activities because of the availability
of mitigating measures).
12. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489 (holding that "it is necessary that a covered entity entertain
misperceptions about the individual ... either that one has a substantially limiting
impairment that one does not have or ... is not so limiting").
13. See, e.g., US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. 1516, 1520 (2002) (reinforcing the
ADA's requirement that a qualified individual with a disability must be able to perform the
essential functions of the position in question).
14. See Toyota, 534 U.S. at 200-01 (applying the Sutton rationale that courts should
determine if an individual is unable to perform a range ofjobs to be substantially limited in
the major life activity of working).
15. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 479 (noting that Congress did not delegate to any agency the
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may reference 16 or apply 7 those regulations.' Moreover, the Court
will pay no heed to established and previously utilized regulations
interpreting disability under an identical definition, 9 but will adopt
the retrogressive notion of disability ° contained therein,2 with
approbation.22
Consequently, despite the Supreme Court's disproportionately
high interest in adjudicating ADA-related claims, an interest
presumably motivated by a desire to lend clarity to this statute's
authority to define and interpret the term "disability").
16. See id. at 480 ("Although the parties dispute the persuasive force of these interpretive
guidelines, we have no need in this case to decide what deference is due.").
17. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. 2045, 2052-53 (2002) (finding that the
EEOC's interpretation of the ADA's direct threat provision was reasonable and thus entitled
to deference).
18. See White, supra note 4, at 579-81 (arguing that the Court should have deferred to
agency interpretations in Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998) and Sutton, 527 U.S. 471).
19. I discuss this below in Part II.
20. See Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein, Disability, Equal Protection, and the
Supreme Court: Standing at the Crossroads of Progressive and Retrogressive Logic in
Constitutional Classification, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFoRM 81, 94 (Fall 2001/Winter 2002)
(arguing that the Court has carried over previous accreted socio-legal conventions in its ADA
decisions).
21. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367-68 (2001) (citing
with approval its previous decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,
442 (1985)). This is problematic for several reasons. See Martha Minow, When Difference Has
Its Home: Group Homes for the Mentally Retarded, Equal Protection and Legal Treatment of
Difference, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 111, 122 (1987) (suggesting that the majority in
Cleburne relied on the so-called "Abnormal Persons" approach to justify its decision and so
.embrace[d] the conception that because difference based on mental competence are real,
natural and immutable, governmental action based on this difference is not suspicious but
instead legitimate"); Silvers & Stein, supra note 20, at 84 (arguing that the Court has adopted
a retrogressive view of disabled individuals that assumes these individuals are incompetent).
22. This formal approval is evidenced, linguistically, in several opinions. See Garrett, 531
U.S. at 367-68 (agreeing that states "could quite hardheadedly-and perhaps hardheartedly
-hold to job-qualification requirements which do not make allowance for the disabled" as long
as they are rational). For an analysis of this retrogressive jurisprudence, see Aviam Soifer,
Courting Anarchy, 82 B.U. L. REV. 699,715 (2002) (stating that Justice Kennedy's concurring
opinion in Garrett reinforces these prejudicial views of the disabled when describing his own
struggle between his baser "'human instincts' (that make people who are different from us
seem very unsettling) on the one hand, and 'the better angels of our nature' on the other")
(footnote omitted).
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application," due to their Procrustean jurisprudence," the central
question of who is "disabled" remains unresolved.
II. DISABILITY AND (LEGISLATIVE) IDENTITY
Justice O'Connor raised a second criticism concerning the
W"uncertainties as to what Congress had in mind'" regarding the
scope of ADA coverage.25 This was due mainly to the legislative
sponsors being "'so eager to get something passed that,'" according
to Justice O'Connor, "what passes hasn't been as carefully written
as a group of law professors might put together.'
2 6
Justice O'Connor is correct in her general assertion that
Congress was indeed negligent when enacting the ADA (I discuss
some reasons for this elsewhere),27 but is incorrect as far as the
reason she proffers.28 Although the ADA's sponsors may have been
23. Some commentators assert a more insidious impetus. Mark A. Rothstein et al., Using
Established Medical Criteria to Define Disability: A Proposal to Amend the Americans With
Disabilities Act, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 243, 244 (2002) (claiming that recent Supreme Court
decisions contravene the statute's intent rather than clarify its application); see also Ann
Marie Girot, "Disability Status" for Asymptomatic HIV? Pondering the Implications,
Unanswered Questions, and Early Application of Bragdon v. Abbott, 1999 UTAH L. REv. 755,
796 (arguing that the Supreme Court's decision in Sutton compounded the confusion already
established in Bragdon regarding ADA definitions).
24. According to the famous myth, Procrustes would offer traveling strangers a meal and
a bed for the night when they passed by his home. The bed, he claimed was "magical," for it
could fit the size of any person who laid upon it. Procrustes' "magic," however, was not the
stuff of Disney movies or childhood bedtime stories. The bed itself did not transform. Rather,
when the visitors retired for the evening, Procrustes would either stretch them out on a rack
or cut off their legs to fit the bed. See BERGEN EvANS, DICTIONARY OF MYTHOLOGY: MAINLY
CLAssIcAL 211 (1970).
25. Lane, supra note 1 (quoting Justice O'Connor).
26. Id. (quoting Justice O'Connor).
27. See Silvers & Stein, supra note 7 (arguing that, absent consciousness-raising, the civil
rights empowerment of disabled people is in jeopardy); Silvers & Stein, supra note 20, at 123
(demonstrating how Congress inadvertently imported social conventions into ADA
jurisprudence); Michael Ashley Stein, Disability and Employment: Alternative Approaches to
Traditional Empirical Research, in EMERGING WORKFORCE ISSUES: W.I.A., TICKET TO WORK,
AND PARTNERSHIPS 95, 96 (L. Robert McConnell ed., 2001) (same); Michael Ashley Stein,
Empirical Implications of Title 1, 85 IOwA L. REv. 1671, 1685 (2000) (asserting that the ADA was
passed without sufficient resources to account for environmental impediments); Stein, supra note
5, at 118-19 (noting that if Congress wanted to accord the disabled constitutionally protected
status, it should have been more overt in stating so).
28. The legislative history that follows is drawn from Silvers & Stein, supra note 20, at
120-21, which also demonstrates the deeper effect of accreted societal biases that are
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"eager"29 to pass a civil rights statute on behalf of the forty-three
million disempowered Americans with disabilities ° subject to
systemic societal prejudice," not only was the definition well
thought out, if poorly chosen,32 it was in fact the considered product
of law professors.3
In defining who would be protected as "disabled," Congress
adopted without alteration the definition of disability from the
Rehabilitation Act. 4 That designation encompassed a group of
people who have "a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual[s],"35 those who have a history of such impairment,36 or
those who are regarded as having an impairment.37
Importing this three-prong disability definition was a matter of
political expediency. Regulations issued in 1977 by the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) (now the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS)) extensively cataloged those who
were considered "handicapped" under the Rehabilitation Act. s Both
entwined in this definition. I am grateful to Professor Silvers for her courtesy.
29. See generally JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, No PITY: PEOPLE WrrH DISABILITIES FORGINGANEw
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 105-41 (1993) (recounting the history and passage of the ADA).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (2000). The Census Bureau not estimates that approximately
52.6 million Americans were disabled in 1997. Press Release, Census Bureau, U.S. Dep't of
Commerce, 11th Anniversary of Americans With Disabilities Act (July 11, 2001), at
http'/www.census.gov/Press-Releasewww/2001/cbOlfflO.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2003).
This empirical fact did not seem to trouble the Supreme Court which, in Sutton, reasoned that
myopics could not have been covered under the ADA after engaging in a bizarre reverse
engineering exercise predicated on the earlier figure of forty-three million. Sutton v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471,484-86 (1999).
31. These are well documented in the ADA Findings, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2)-(9) (2000),
and are discursively set out in Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act:
Analysis and Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 413, 416-26 (1991).
32. See Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein, From Plessy (1896) and Goesart (1948) to
Cleburne (1985) and Garrett (2001): A Chill Wind From the Past Blows Equal Protection
Away, in BACKLASH AGAINST THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: REINTERPRETING
DISABILITY RIGHTS 357-59 (Linda Hamilton Krieger ed., 2002) (arguing that disability
discrimination jurisprudence should be reconceptualized to mirror race and gender-based
discrimination jurisprudence); Silvers & Stein, supra note 20, at 119-20.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 51-57.
34. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 705(9) (2000).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
36. Id. § 12102(2XB).
37. Id. § 12102(2)(C).
38. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3 (2001).
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agencies and courts relied almost uniformly on these interpretive
guidelines when enforcing the Rehabilitation Act. 9 Although
legislators excluded several controversial conditions from ADA
coverage, 40 Congress viewed the incorporation of Rehabilitation Act
terms as a swift and unproblematic way of limning ADA coverage. 1
Along with the wholesale importation of the definition of
disability from the Rehabilitation Act into the ADA, Congress also
introduced that statute's formulation of what comprises disability-
based discrimination. This was neither an obvious nor an unopposed
choice for Congress. Dissatisfied with the scope of pre-ADA civil
rights statutes affecting the disabled,"2 academic commentators'
and disability rights groups" had advocated amending the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 through addition of the term "handicapped" since
the mid-1980s. The result of this emendation would have been
protections against discrimination paralleling that of other groups;
for example, "on the basis of" having a disability was a formula
utilized in some other disability-related antidiscrimination stat-
39. Chai R. Feldblum, The Americans with Disabilities Act Definition of Disability, 7 LAB.
LAW. 11, 12-13 (1991) (demonstrating the clarity that the 1977 HEW regulations lent to the
ADA's definition of disability).
40. Homosexuals, transvestites, pedophiles, kleptomaniacs, and exhibitionists, among
others, were excluded from statutory coverage. See 42 U.S.C. § 12211.
41. See generally Burgdorf, supra note 31, at 445-51 (noting that the 1974 definition of
disability under the Rehabilitation Act came under much judicial and regulatory scrutiny,
thereby creating a settled precedent for the ADA).
42. See Janet A. Flaccus, Discrimination Legislation for the Handicapped: Much Ferment
and the Erosion of Coverage, 55 U. CIN. L. REv. 81, 81-82 (1986) (highlightingthe relatively
extensive protection from discrimination that Congress gave to certain groups while enacting
only two limited statutes for protection of the disabled); Janet Flaccus, Handicap
Discrimination Legislation: With Such Inadequate Coverage at the Federal Level, Can State
Legislation Be of Any Help?, 40 ARK. L. REv. 261, 262-64 (1986) (demonstrating the limited
protection that the Rehabilitation Act affords to individuals with disabilities).
43. See, e.g., Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr. & Christopher G. Bell, Eliminating Discrimination
Against Physically and Mentally Handicapped Persons: A Statutory Blueprint, 8 MENTAL &
PHYSICAL Di$ABIu'TM L. REP. 64, 71 (1984) (arguing that "[d]iscrimination against
handicapped persons should be prohibited in all the contexts where Congress has seen fit to
outlaw other forms of discrimination").
44. Most prominent was the National Council on the Handicapped's strong opposition to
the Rehabilitation Act model: "Proof of class membership is not required under other types
of nondiscrimination laws, and statutes guaranteeing equal opportunity for persons with
disabilities need not have such a requirement either." NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE
HANDICAPPED, ON THE THRESHOLD OF INDEPENDENCE A-25 (1988).
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utes. 5 This formulation would also have mirrored the one applied
to people covered by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).46
By contrast, the Rehabilitation Act. (as well as a handful of
statutes modeled after it) 7 requires that those individuals defined
as having a disability must also satisfy a second requirement, that
they be "qualified" individuals with disabilities;" a term which the
Act defined as those individuals who can perform the essential
functions of a given job either with or without reasonable
accommodation.' 9 The Rehabilitation Act's formulation requiring
disabled plaintiffs to prove their qualifications was incorporated into
the ADA's Title .5°
Although this heavy adaptation of definitional terms and admin-
istrative agency regulations may have been unfortunate in some
respects,51 it was not the result of the type of slipshod drafting
reproved by Justice O'Connor.52 At least three of the people who
helped draft and negotiate the ADA's provisions were, in fact, law
professors. Moreover, Chai Feldblum, s Robert Burgdorf,5' and
45. Examples include the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of disability for the
purposes of Foreign Service employment, 22 U.S.C. § 3905(bXl) (2000); participation in any
pursuit funded under the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C.
§ 3151(a) (2000); activities of labor organizations, 5 U.S.C. § 7116(bX4) (2000); and the sale
or rental of housing, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(l)-(2).
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17.
47. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 1374(1) (1988) (prohibiting air carriers from discriminating
against qualified individuals with handicaps).
48. Id. A clear demonstration of this standard, as well as the circularity of its reasoning,
can be seen in Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 397 (1979), where the
Court held that because a student with a profound hearing disorder could not be reasonably
accommodated in a clinical nurse training program, adverse actions taken against her could
not be construed as disability discrimination because she was not an "otherwise qualified
handicapped individual" under the terms of the statute. Id.
49. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 791 (2000).
50. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8), 12112(a).
51. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
52. Lane, supra note 1.
53. See Feldblum, supra note 4, at 92 (suggesting that changing definitions under the
ADA would cause confusion unnecessarily); Feldblum, supra note 39, at 12-13 (stating that
the ADA's definition of disability is almost identical to that of the Rehabilitation Act).
54. See Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., 'Substantially Limited" Protection From Disability
Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of
Disability, 42 VILL. L. REV. 409, 438-39 (arguing that most regulations and judicial decisions
have supported both acts' definitions and principles). See generally Burgdorf, supra note 31,
at 444-45 (drawing parallels between section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA).
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Arlene Mayerson,55 each believed that extending the Rehabilitation
Act's extant and well-received system to the ADA would provide a
clear standard for determining which individuals were included
under the ADA's auspices.56 As Feldblum has stated: "Congress felt
comfortable relying on a definition that had fifteen years of exper-
ience behind it, and disability rights advocates felt comfortable that
the same individuals with the wide range of impairment who had
been covered under existing disability antidiscrimination law would
be covered under the ADA." 7 Again, the drafters' deliberate and
conscious choice of including the Rehabilitation Act's language in
the ADA was based on their assumption that the ADA would be
viewed as a slight change from its predecessor and, therefore,
interpreted similarly.
Thus, despite Justice O'Connor's admonition, it was law profes-
sors who very consciously promulgated the ADA's definition of
disability as it presently exists. Although their decision turned out
to be an unfortunate one, it certainly was not lightly considered.
III. DISABILITY AND (CONCEPTIONS OF) IDENTITY
We have come full circle to the question initially raised: Who
should be considered "disabled" under the ADA? On October 27,
2001, more than a dozen scholars met to discuss this issue at a
symposium convened at the College of William and Mary School of
Law."8 Their research, which is published in this issue, offers rare
insight.5 9
During the course of the convivium, several major themes
emerged regarding the intersection between disability, identity, and
55. See Arlene Mayerson, Title I-Employment Provisions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 499 (1991) (noting the overwhelming contributions that the
Rehabilitation Act made to the ADA).
56. As did other commentators. See 136 CONG. REC. E1913, E1914 (1990) (statement of
Rep. Hoyer) (arguing that the ADA's definition of "regarded as" should mirror the same
language in the Rehabilitation Act).
57. Feldblum, supra note 4, at 92.
58. Participating, but not contributing (in writing) to this issue, were the aforementioned
Davison Douglas and Anita Silvers, as well as the Honorable Robert M. Bell, Chief Judge of
the State of Maryland.
59. As well as rare ideological balance by including some theories that will not be to the
taste of some of the disability rights community.
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the law. The articles that follow focus on perceptions of disability-
within the disability "community," among the Justices on the
Supreme Court, and in society more generally-and the
effectiveness (or lack thereof) of the ADA.
Continuing a historical and empirical research agenda,60 Peter
Blanck and Chen Song, in "Never Forget What They Did Here": Civil
War Pensions for Gettysburg Union Army Veterans and Disability in
Nineteenth-Century America,61 demonstrate how access to the
pension system was driven, at least in part, by public perceptions of
disability.62 They consider the extent to which a veteran was
considered more or less "worthy" of benefits depending upon the
nature of his disability and his role in the war. They suggest as one
implication of their study the need for further investigation on the
impact that extra-legal factors have on present day disability
jurisprudence. 63
Turning to the present, in Disabling the ADA: Essences, Better
Angels, and the Unprincipled Neutrality Claims,64 Aviam Soifer
assesses the Supreme Court's ADA jurisprudence.' He asserts that
the Justices have erected an unempathetic emotional barrier
between themselves and the disabled.' All the while, a majority of
the Court remains firmly unconvinced that the disabled require (or
even deserve) legal protection.67 The Justices' general denial of the
need for legal protection is even more egregious for those with
mental disabilities.68 Samuel Bagenstos, in contrast, attempts to
explain the Court's recent decisions in The Americans with
60. See Peter Blanck, Civil War Pensions and Disability, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 109 (2001);
Peter David Blanck & Michael Millender, Before Disability Civil Rights: Civil War Pensions
and the Politics of Disability in America, 52 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2000); Peter Blanck & Chen Song,
Civil War Pension Attorneys and Disability Politics, 35 U. MICH. J.L REFORM 137 (Fall
2001/Winter 2002); Peter Blanck & Chen Song, 'With Malice Toward None; With Charity
Toward All": Civil War Pensions for Native and Foreign-Born Union Army Veterans, 11
TRANsNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2001).
61. 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1109 (2003).
62. Id. at 1112.
63. Id. at 1164.
64. 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1285 (2003).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1288.
67. Id. at 1290.
68. Id. at 1292-94.
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Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform"' by suggesting that the outcomes
of these cases are consistent with at least some of the underlying
justifications for the ADA. Specifically, he examines the arguments
put forth by disability rights advocates and their congressional
supporters regarding moving people with disabilities from welfare
to work.70 Bagenstos concludes that the larger disability rights
movement ignores the impact of the welfare reform argument at its
peril.
Moving beyond social and judicial notions of disability, Susan
Stefan tackles the issue of identification within the disability
community itself. In "Discredited" and "Discreditable": The Search
for Political Identity by People with Psychiatric Diagnoses,7 she
describes two separate categories of people with psychiatric
disabilities: the "discredited" and the "discreditable."72 Although
these groups differ in the way that society labels them and in the
manner in which they view the medical profession, both suffer from
social stigma and disbelief.73 Stefan argues that both groups must
recognize and accept the other's self-definition in order to promote
their common interests.74
Whereas some of the authors address the coverage of the ADA, in
other words, how to define disability, others address the economic
underpinnings of the law, and query the extent to which it could be
more effective. Amy Wax, for example, argues that the ADA can
improve social welfare overall so long as people with disabilities in
the workplace are somewhat productive.75 Nonetheless, she asserts
that because of minimum wage and equal pay legislation, employers
may not be willing to hire workers with disabilities even when it is
economically beneficial to society as a whole.76
Accepting Wax's premise that disabled workers may be less
productive than those without disabilities, Stewart Schwab and
69. 44 WM. & MARY L. REv. 921 (2003).
70. Id. at 961-7 1.
71. 44 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1341 (2003).
72. Id. at 1349.
73. Id. at 1350.
74. Id.
75. Amy L. Wax, Disability, Reciprocity, and 'Real Efficiency. A Unified Approach, 44
WM. & MARY L. REv. 1421 (2003).
76. Id. at 1424.
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Steven Willborn investigate some economic aspects of hiring
disabled workers. In Reasonable Accommodation of Workplace
Disabilities," they highlight distinctions between the "soft" anti-
discrimination preference under Title VII and the "hard" accom-
modation preference under the ADA.78 Because the latter favors cost
accommodations over productivity accommodations, Schwab and
Willborn argue that disabled workers should be allowed to subsidize
their accommodations when "extra-reasonable,"79 and ultimately
predict that Title VII and similar civil rights laws will evolve to
incorporate elements of the ADA model.80 J.H. Verkerke likewise
tackles the antidiscrimination/accommodation debate.8 ' Responding
to one scholar's recent claim that antidiscrimination and accom-
modation can, at times, overlap, 2 he suggests that civil rights
mandates fall along a continuum, with antidiscrimination and
accommodation serving as anchors on each end. Here he con-
cludes that although the distinction between antidiscrimination and
accommodation sometimes blur, the categories nevertheless draw
a "meaningful distinction" in defining and remedying employment
discrimination. 3
Following on these three economic examinations are a pair of
empirical investigations into the economics of ADA employment.
In Labor Force Participation and Income of Individuals with
Disabilities in Sheltered and Competitive Employment: Cross-
Sectional and Longitudinal Analyses of Seven States During the
1980s and 1990s,"' Peter Blanck, Helen Schartz, and Kevin Schartz
examine the labor force participation and wages of individuals who
have transitioned from facility-based work to employment in
integrated settings. 5 Notable among their findings is that those
individuals who transitioned from sheltered workshops to inte-
77. 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1197 (2003).
78. Id. at 1209.
79. Id. at 1279.
80. Id. at 1204.
81. J.H. Verkerke, Disaggregating Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 44 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1385 (2003).
82. See Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642
(2001).
83. Verkerke, supra note 81, at 1387.
84. 44 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1029 (2003).
85. Id.
918 [Vol. 44:907
FOREWORD: DISABILITY AND IDENTITY
grated employment settings improved both their earned income and
their levels of daily living skills." Susanne Bruy~re's study, outlined
in Identity and Disability in the Workplace, 7 also examines labor
force participation, but focuses specifically on the barriers to
employment faced by people with disabilities. She finds that despite
the passage of the ADA, discrimination and stereotypes continue to
create a disparity in employment opportunities for the disabled.88
CONCLUSION
This Symposium has contributed to the disability-related legal
literature by lending insight to the ongoing and unanswered
question of who should be covered under the ADA. Much more
thought and work needs to be done in this regard. Beyond learning
the boundaries of who ought to be covered under the statute's
auspices, and how such determinations can be made predictably,
are larger issues relating to identity. For example, do the disabled
have a unifying group identity in the same way that other
statutorily protected groups-say women, or people of color-are
perceived to have? 9 Likewise, can other aspects of the anti-
discrimination canon-for instance, hostile work environment-be
applied to the disabled?' What significance do exogenous factors,
like Department of Justice enforcement, have upon the ADA's
efficacy? And, if the ADA is not effective, how might its efficacy be
86. Id. at 1030.
87. 44 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1173 (2003).
88. Id. at 1173.
89. For a discussion of this issue, see Adrienne Asch, Critical Race Theory, Feminism, and
Disability: Reflections on Social Justice and Personal Identity, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 391 (2001);
Silvers & Stein, supra note 20.
90. For analyses of disability-based harassment in the workplace, see Lisa Eichorn,
Hostile Environment Actions, Title VII, and the ADA- The Limits of the Copy-and-Paste
Function, 77 WASH. L. REV. 575 (2001); Frank S. Ravitch, Beyond Reasonable Accommodation:
The Availability and Structure of a Cause of Action for Workplace Harassment Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 15 CARDozo L. REV. 1475 (1994); Holland M. Tahvonen, Note,
Disability-Based Harassment: Standing and Standards for a 'New" Cause of Action, 44 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1485 (2003).
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improved?9 My hope is that this Symposium will stimulate further
dialogue about these quandaries.
91. See generally Susan Schwochau & Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, Part III: Does the ADA Disable the Disabled?, 21 BERUCLEY
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 271 (2000); Stein, supra note 27.
920 [Vol. 44:907
